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Anti-corruption, transparency and accountability in health: concepts,
frameworks, and approaches
Taryn Vian
School of Nursing and Health Professions, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
Background: As called for by the Sustainable Development Goals, governments, develop-
ment partners and civil society are working on anti-corruption, transparency and account-
ability approaches to control corruption and advance Universal Health Coverage.
Objectives: The objective of this review is to summarize concepts, frameworks, and
approaches used to identify corruption risks and consequences of corruption on health
systems and outcomes. We also inventory interventions to fight corruption and increase
transparency and accountability.
Methods: We performed a critical review based on a systematic search of literature in
PubMed and Web of Science and reviewed background papers and presentations from two
international technical meetings on the topic of anti-corruption and health. We identified
concepts, frameworks and approaches and summarized updated evidence of types and
causes corruption in the health sector.
Results: Corruption, or the abuse of power for private gain, in health systems includes bribes
and kickbacks, embezzlement, fraud, political influence/nepotism and informal payments,
among other behaviors. Drivers of corruption include individual and systems level factors
such as financial pressures, poorly managed conflicts of interest, and weak regulatory and
enforcement systems. We identify six typologies and frameworks that model relationships
influencing the scope and seriousness of corruption, and show how anti-corruption strategies
such as transparency, accountability, and civic participation can affect corruption risk. Little
research exists on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures; however, interventions such
as community monitoring and insurance fraud control programs show promise.
Conclusions: Corruption undermines the capacity of health systems to contribute to better
health, economic growth and development. Interventions and resources on prevention and
control of corruption are essential components of health system strengthening for Universal
Health Coverage.
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The UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights recognizes corruption as an ‘enormous obstacle
to the realization of all human rights,’ and advocates
transparency, accountability, non-discrimination and
meaningful participation as effective means to fight
corruption [1,2]. Corruption fundamentally under-
mines good governance, weakens health systems, and
violates human rights. It also disrupts progress toward
the goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC), the
principle that all individuals and communities should
be able to access the essential health services they need,
without financial hardship [3]. Governments, develop-
ment partners, and health researchers are promoting
anti-corruption efforts to control corruption in health
systems across the globe; however, existing research
does not provide a comprehensive picture of how
these efforts align. It is therefore critical to look across
the different frameworks used and consider applicabil-
ity of strategies in different settings. This can help to
advance a coherent agenda to prevent corruption
through health systems strengthening. Table 1 defines
the key concepts of anti-corruption, transparency, and
accountability (ACTA). These definitions, and the rela-
tionships among these concepts, are discussed below.
Anti-corruption
Corruption is defined as abuse of entrusted power for
private gain [4]. Healthcare fraud and abuse are often
included in the discussion of corruption, as these prac-
tices often involve abuse of power [5]. Anti-corruption,
therefore, comprises actions taken to prevent, curb, or
oppose corruption, and to mitigate its negative impacts.
Practices defined as corruption may vary depending
on country and context. Hence, anti-corruption efforts
can take multiple forms depending on the situation. For
example, one study in Brazil defined corruption to
include diversion of federally transferred resources
from municipal bank accounts, claim of purchases
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that never actually occurred, over-invoicing goods and
services at a value above marketplace, and irregular
public procurements marked by illegal call-for-bids in
any respect (such as the concession of the contract to
a family member’s firm) [6]. The UN Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), specifies that signatory
countries must criminalize specific forms of corruption,
including bribery of national and foreign public offi-
cials, embezzlement, misappropriation, diversion of
property by public officials, trading in influence, abuse
of functions, and illicit enrichment [7].While this treaty
sets internationally agreed standards, country compli-
ance varies [8].
Transparency
Transparency refers to the public availability of
usable information. This may mitigate corruption
risks as it allows scrutiny of public actors and their
decisions. Governments have an obligation to provide
clarity on the rules and results of health care delivery
processes and to reveal any secondary interests that
may influence decisions of health care providers and
policy makers [9,10]. Transparency is considered
a necessary, though not sufficient condition for
accountability and the prevention of corruption [11].
Accountability
Accountability refers to the obligation of those in
power to explain, make understandable, and take
responsibility for their decisions, actions, and perfor-
mance. Officials are responsible for acting according
to standards and commitments made public in the
form of laws, regulations, guidelines, procedures, and
policies [10]. Experts note three elements of account-
ability: 1) answerability, or the obligation to justify
one’s action; 2) enforcement, the consequences
imposed if the action and justification are not satis-
factory; and 3) responsiveness, the willingness of
those held accountable to respond to demands made
[12]. Enforcement must impose consequences on the
corrupt agent that are large enough to deter corrup-
tion [13]. Social accountability can include grievance
procedures and social audits to collect qualitative and
quantitative data on citizen opinions about and lived
experiences with services [14].
Linkages among concepts
Corruption thrives in settings where agents are able to
bend or break rules without being detected, either
because the rules themselves are not codified in writ-
ing, are ambiguous, or are not made public, or because
performance measurement, monitoring, and enforce-
ment are lacking. Lambert-Mogiliansky (2015) high-
lights the links between transparency, accountability,
and corruption, stating that ‘In the absence of any
signal of the official’s behavior (e.g. a performance
measure, a verification outcome, announcements, and
service users’ complaints) citizens have no way of
preventing a corrupt official from diverting money:
the official is in effect not at all accountable for the
use of resources’ [12]. When policies, entitlements,
procedures, and performance measures are transpar-
ent, observers can detect improper behavior more
easily. The greater the transparency, the more space
for government officials to be held accountable for
their actions [15]. Transparency applied to processes
can make citizens aware of government commitments
(expressed through policies and plans), and the targets
against which government performance should be
measured. Transparency applied to service delivery
can help citizens and government oversight agencies
to know where performance is falling short, and to ask
government agents to answer for the performance
deficits.
Although transparency is a necessary input, it is
also important to consider how to share information,
and with whom, to best facilitate accountability. For
example, a country might undertake an annual bud-
get survey to measure the proportion of people who
had a health concern but did not seek care for finan-
cial reasons. Data analyzed over time might show that
the state is making progress on this measure (i.e.
increasing financial access), but that the progress
was heavily weighted toward urban populations.
Having this regularly collected, publicly available
Table 1. Definitions.
Term Definition
Corruption Abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This includes bribes, embezzlement, misappropriation, diversion of government
property, trading in influence, abuse of function, and illicit enrichment.
Fraud and abuse Fraud: Illegally obtaining a benefit of any nature by intentionally breaking a rule. Abuse: unjustly obtaining a benefit of any nature
by knowingly stretching a rule or by taking advantage of an absence of rule.
Includes reimbursement fraud, procurement fraud, unauthorized absenteeism, ghost workers, and other forms.
Transparency Transparency is a public value that requires that citizens be informed about how and why decisions are made, including
procedures, criteria applied by government decision makers, the evidence used to reach decisions, and results. Often
transparency refers to access to information.
Accountability Accountability is a public value that requires government institutions to explain and make understandable their performance in
achieving goals and addressing the needs of the public, in comparison to standards and commitments. It requires visible,
responsive action if standards and commitments are not met.
Sources: Transparency International www.transparency.org; UN Convention Against Corruption https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/;
Sommersguter-Reichmann, et al., 2018; Vian, et al., 2017; Paschke, et al., 2018.
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measure of financial access to care can allow the
government and citizens to monitor progress toward
UHC goals, and highlight remedial actions which
could improve performance such as targeted efforts
to reduce out-of-pocket payments (including infor-
mal payments or bribes) among rural residents.
Objectives
The objective of this critical review is to summarize
ACTA concepts, frameworks, and approaches used to
measure health corruption, and to examine the conse-
quences of corruption on health systems and outcomes.
The review also examines ACTA interventions and stra-
tegies to reduce corruption risks. It is timely to provide
a current picture of how the situation has changed in
recent years using updated information. Thus, we update
an earlier review published in 2008 by Vian, which also
looked at frameworks and methodologies to measure
corruption risks in health systems [16]. Using recent
literature, we examine evidence on interventions and
propose future directions for research.
Methods
Our study design was a critical review to analyze
material from diverse sources including a systematic
search of peer-reviewed literature and documentation
from two international technical meetings [17]. For
the peer-reviewed literature, we searched for articles
within PubMed and Web of Science using the key-
words: corruption AND health AND (framework OR
model OR theory). Our search was limited the years
2008 to 2018, and to studies written in English. After
removing duplicates, the search generated 82 abstracts.
We retained references that described corruption pro-
blems or consequences or provided evidence of the
association of corruption and health outcomes, while
removing editorials, commentaries, and letters.
Following the initial screening, 73 abstracts remained.
We then reviewed the full texts and excluded articles
with only casual referencing of corruption in the
health sector or that did not propose theoretical con-
structs or provide empirical evidence. This resulted in
46 articles. Appendix A provides a summary of these
citations.
This paper also draws on insights from two expert
technical meetings and related background papers
and presentations commissioned by the World
Health Organization (WHO) on the topic of anti-
corruption, transparency and accountability in the
health sector. The meetings held November 2017
and March 2018 in Geneva provided a unique
opportunity for technical discussions among health
and corruption experts working in this field.
Appendix B includes the list of attendees and
references.
Our analysis was guided by the themes included in
the original review of corruption in the health sector
mentioned above (Vian, 2008), including measures of
corruption in the health sector, evidence of conse-
quences, theoretical frameworks, and anti-corruption
approaches [16].
In the next section, we present our findings on
measuring corruption (including updated evidence for
key types of corruption); consequences (how corrup-
tion and lack of transparency and accountability under-
mine health); frameworks and models for corruption,
transparency and accountability; and anti-corruption
approaches (interventions and evidence of effective-
ness). We conclude with areas for further research.
Results
Measuring corruption
Corruption is heterogeneous and multiple measures
can help triangulate the problem [18]. Corruption in
health is measured through surveys of attitudes and
experience [19–22], audits and special studies [23–25],
and complaints or investigative reporting [26,27]. Proxy
measures such as prices may indicate procurement cor-
ruption [28]. Qualitative studies of corruption percep-
tions help inform prevention efforts [29–31].
In Transparency International’s Global Corruption
Barometer (GCB) survey [32], two questions relate to
health: 1) respondents are asked about perceptions of
corruption, and 2) for those who sought health care
services in the past year, respondents are asked
whether they paid a bribe (Figure 1).
Such surveys can show changes over time. For exam-
ple, inNicaragua, public perception of corruption and the
proportion of people who reported having made an
informal payment for health services declined over
time, although the decline in perceptions lagged behind
experience [33]. Respondents’ perception that commu-
nity opinionsmattered tomunicipal government officials
was strongly associated with not believing the govern-
ment was corrupt. Transparency appeared to engage
community trust: being informed about government
use of funds was associated with more positive commu-
nity opinions [33].
Specific types of corruption have been measured in
more detail, including informal payments, ghost
workers, absenteeism, dual practice, health insurance
fraud, and substandard and falsified medicines. We
summarize evidence on the scope and nature of these
problems below.
Informal payments
Informal payments occur in many regions and rates
vary widely [22,34,35]. A recent systematic review of
38 studies on methodology and burden of informal
patient payments found that 2–80% of respondents
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had made informal payments [22]. Regional data on
informal payments are tracked through public attitude
survey polls conducted by non-partisan research insti-
tutions over time, such as the Afrobarometer and the
European Commission’s Eurobarometer program.
Analysis of Afrobarometer polls from 2011–2013 in 33
countries in Africa found that the proportion of respon-
dents who paid a bribe in the last 12 months at a public
health facility was over 40% in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, Egypt and Morocco, and less than 5% in
Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Namibia and Swaziland [36]. According to the
Eurobarometer 470 report conducted in 2017,
European countries with the highest informal payment
rates included Romania (19%), Hungary (17%), Greece
(13%), and Lithuania (12%) [37].
Few studies have tried to separate the burdens posed
by different types of payments such as cash payments,
medicines or supplies a patient is asked to purchase
from an outside pharmacy, or gifts given voluntarily
to express gratitude. Within the same country, rates
may vary over time or due to methodological differ-
ences (e.g. recall periods) [34]. Rates may also be
affected by reticence, or respondents’ unwillingness to
disclose having made an informal payment [38].
Ghost workers and absenteeism
Another measure of corruption is the number of ghost
workers, i.e. a person fraudulently added to the payroll
who does not actually work. For example, a World Bank
Public Expenditure study conducted in Honduras in
2001 found that 8.3% of general practitioners on payroll
were ‘ghosts’ [39]. A related measure is unsanctioned
absenteeism, where a worker is legitimately on the pay-
roll but is chronically absent without approved reason
[25]. In Honduras, unexcused absenteeism was 26%
across all staff categories in the previously cited 2001
study, while a study conducted in 2004 found absentee-
ism in Bangladesh was 42% among physicians and 35%
among other staff [39,40]. In Rwanda, a 2015 study
found one-third of health workers in primary care facil-
ities were absent [41]. World Bank Service Delivery
Indicator Survey data from Africa in 2012–2016 show
absent rates ranging from 14.3% of health facility staff in
Tanzania, to 33.1% in Niger (Figure 2).
Dual practice and corruption risks
Clinicians who hold a salaried public sector job while
maintaining a private practice are engaged in dual prac-
tice. Dual practice presents opportunities for corruption:
for example, a physician may divert medicines, equip-
ment, vehicles and fuel, funds, and patients from the
public sector to her own private practice or ancillary
services in which she has a financial interest [35,42–45].
Dual practice may reduce the availability and quality of
services in the public sector, and exacerbate inequities in
health worker distribution. It can also increase absentee-
ism and out-of-pocket or informal payments [44–46].
Figure 1. Countries with highest percentages of respondents reporting perceptions that the health sector is corrupt or
extremely corrupt and reporting payment of a bribe in the past 12 months.
Source: Transparency International, 2013. Study included 107 countries. Albania and Russia, which had high perceived health sector corruption,
did not have bribe data, and therefore are not shown.
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Surveys can estimate the extent and types of dual prac-
tice, and qualitative data collection may shed light on
possibilities for abuse of power. This is a complex sys-
tems problem, and the risks of dual practice must be
considered along with the potential positive consequence
of enhancing health worker retention [46].
Reimbursement fraud and abuse
Insurance billing fraud refers to intentional deception
or misrepresentation made with the knowledge that the
deception could result in unauthorized benefits, while
abuse is used to describe problematic behavior which is
not clearly against the law or where certain elements of
the fraud definition (such as knowing deception) are
missing [47]. Organizations and governments use audit
reports and statistical methods to try to estimate the
scope of the problem. For example, a study published in
JAMA and using data from 2011 estimated that $82 to
$272 billion annually is lost to fraud and abuse in the
U.S., or 3–10% of GDP [48]. Based on data collected
from 33 organizations in 7 countries, Gee and Button
estimate global average losses fromhealthcare fraud and
abuse to be 6.19% of total health expenditure, or
$455 billion in 2015 [49].
Substandard and falsified medical products
Substandard and falsified (SF) medical products enter
markets in part due to regulatory failures connected to
corruption. SF products cause unnecessary morbidity,
mortality, and antimicrobial resistance [50,51]. An
estimated 122,350 malaria deaths in children under
five were associated with poor quality anti-malarial
medicines, about 3.75% of all child deaths in 39 sub-
Saharan African countries [52]. SFs are increasing in
prevalence, especially in Africa [53]. A systematic
review and meta-analysis of 96 studies published
before November 2017 found that 13.6% of essential
medicines tested in low- and middle-income countries
(LMIC) failed quality analysis overall, with regional
prevalence of 18.7% in Africa, and 13.7% in Asia
[53]. A 2013 systematic review examined prevalence
data from 15 studies of specific antimicrobials. The
median prevalence of SF medicines was 28.5% (range
11–48%) [54]. A study of Ciprofloxacin treatment
from 10 Latin American countries found that 7% of
medicines were not good quality. Corruption in reg-
ulatory systems was a key predictor of poor quality
drugs [55].
Consequences: how corruption and lack of
transparency and accountability undermine
health
Corruption and lack of transparency and accountability
undermine health by limiting equitable access to health
services and financial protection [56,57]. In countries
with greater corruption, citizens report being less satis-
fied with the quality of health services [58]. Pervasive
corruption and lack of transparency also influence
other health determinants such as access to clean
water, sanitation, food, and housing [59–62].
Researchers estimate that 1.6% of world deaths in
children, or 140,000 child deaths per year, could be
indirectly attributed to corruption [63]. Countries
with greater levels of corruption have higher rates of
infant, child, and maternal mortality [64–67]. Public
spending on health had a stronger effect in reducing
child mortality in countries with lower levels of cor-
ruption and higher institutional capacity [68]. A 2010
study in 64 countries found that bribery was corre-
lated with higher death rates for women giving birth,
even after adjusting for per capita income and share
of total spending on health [69]. Using 2000–2004
data from the World Health Survey, researchers
determined that corruption was consistently asso-
ciated with poor health among African adults in 20
countries [70].
Absenteeism can lead to significant negative health
consequences for mothers and children. A study con-
ducted using 2005–2007 longitudinal data from an
antenatal clinic in Western Kenya found that
women who were not tested during their first antena-
tal visit due to nurse absenteeism were 50 percentage
points less likely to learn their HIV status during
pregnancy [71]. Indicators of good governance,
including control of corruption, are significantly
associated with higher antiretroviral therapy (ART)
and prevention of maternal to child transmission
(PMTCT) coverage [72]. Corruption is associated
with antibiotic resistance in Europe, possibly because
corrupt governments provide less supervision of anti-
biotic use, especially in the private sector [73,74].
Finally, corruption may have an adverse effect on
mental health: researchers found a strong link
between individuals’ experience of corruption and
self-reported anxiety [75]. The authors suggest that



























Figure 2. Health worker absence from health facility rates in
5 African countries, 2012–2015.
Source: Service Delivery Indicator Survey, World Bank in partnership with
the African Economic Research Consortium and the African Development
Bank, www.sdindicators.org, Accessed 28 January 2018.
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ethical discomfort associated with corruption may
drive anxiety, building the case for anti-corruption
interventions as a way to increase health and well-
being [75].
Informal payments are a barrier to accessing
health care services (Table 2), causing greater harm
for poor and rural populations [36,76,77]. A study of
33 African countries found that informal payments
were concentrated among the poorest, indicating
a regressive payment system in all but four countries
(Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland)
[36]. Using data from 2009–2012, researchers in
Moldova highlighted the regressive nature of out-of-
pocket payments (including informal payments).
They observed that 29% of respondents in the poorest
quintile could not afford medicines or services com-
pared to only 5% in the highest quintile, and 22.3% of
rural residents did not seek care due to financial
reasons, compared to 6.2% of urban residents [78].
Audits reveal specific financial losses to corruption.
For example, an audit of $17 million dollars in govern-
ment Ebola spending in Sierra Leone found that one-
third of money was not properly accounted for [26].
According to a statement issued by the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
there were identified losses of 6 million Swiss Francs
($5.9 million USD) in Ebola funding due to embezzle-
ment, fraudulent billing, over-inflated prices, and pro-
curement corruption [79]. The Office of the Auditor
General in Zambia uncovered embezzlement and unac-
counted funds totaling $7.7 million,involving Ministry
of Health employees who were organizing fake work-
shops and taking advances that were never repaid
[80,81]. Auditors documented weaknesses in audit
reports over several years, but no one acted on these
findings, leaving administrative systems vulnerable to
corruption.
Frameworks for anti-corruption, transparency,
and accountability
We identified six typologies and frameworks relevant
to corruption in the health sector. Table 3 sum-
marizes the purpose of the framework, and its con-
structs. This section also describes several models
related to transparency and accountability.
Corruption frameworks
Two of the typologies (EHFCN Waste Typology©
and Corruption in the Health Sector Typology)
focus on types of wrongdoing in the European health
sector context [35,82,83]. Other frameworks link spe-
cific actors to types of corruption or integrity viola-
tions (Five Key Actors in the Health System model,
OECD Integrity Violations Framework) [84,85]. The
fifth framework (Typology of Individual and
Institutional Corruption) is used to distinguish cor-
ruption that involves individual abuse of power, com-
pared to corruption where institutions engage in
activities that promote ends which are not aligned
with their primary purpose [5,86,87].
Table 2. Consequences and correlates of informal payments in the health sector.
Consequences of informal payments
● Deters people from seeking care when needed.
● Poses a financial burden on families, leading to higher levels of poverty and inequality.
● Reinforces a two-tiered system, where people from low-income households seek care in less specialized facilities to avoid informal payments, while
wealthy households have access to advanced and specialized treatment.
● Prevents or delays health reforms, as individuals benefiting from informal payments (high-income households and healthcare providers) resist
reform.
● Undermines social justice in society and trust in the healthcare system, as people are forced to pay for care that should have been provided free of
charge or was already paid for through official fees or premium payments.
Correlates of informal payments
● Household wealth: being from a wealthier household is associated with a higher likelihood of informal payment because wealthier households
have more resources to pay.
● Employed by government: Working for the government is associated with a lower likelihood of informal payment: government workers have
contacts and access to influence that can help them avoid having to pay.
● Healthcare quality: Lower service quality in terms of long wait times, lack of medicines, absence of personnel, and disrespectful treatment are
associated with higher likelihood of informal payment, as people seek to pay in order to be attended to by staff, or to jump a queue.
● Health status: Worse self-assessed health status is associated with higher likelihood of informal payment, as people have to use services more
frequently and have more concern about the impact on their health if they do not pay.
● Social network: Having a friend, relative, or classmate who can ‘help when needed’ is associated with higher likelihood of informal payment,
because the social network can be used to obtain resources to pay, and social norms influence individual behavior.
● Regional and country characteristics: Differences in region and country political, economic, and social factors may affect the practice of informal
payments; for example, more transparency and accountability in the healthcare system and public administration in general may reduce rates.
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The sixth framework, Vian’s 2008 framework, synthe-
sizes earlier work by corruption researchers including the
fraud triangle theory [88] and Klitgaard’s heuristic model
for anti-corruption [89] to model factors influencing cor-
ruption in the health sector [16]. These include pressures,
opportunities, and rationalizations. Pressures contribute to
corruption risk in several ways. For example, Hernández-
Aguado andChile-Rosell (2018) observed that health poli-
cies captured by interested actors may shift the policy-
making process away from the public interest towards
narrow private interests [90]. The authors identified pres-
sures applied by parliamentarians to favor certain pharma-
ceutical companies, and described economic offers to join
companies after leaving government (‘revolving door cor-
ruption’) and bribes or gifts as creating pressures which
result in corrupt decisions [90]. Pressures can also be
financial or structural such as low wages and benefits,
inadequately equipped health centers, and lack of positive
reinforcement to do what is right [43].
Opportunities for corruption include monopoly
(which limits the choice available to citizens who are
forced to interact with corrupt agents), too much discre-
tion, limited accountability for performance, lack of
transparency, weak citizen voice (participation by citizens
in planning and monitoring government services), and
failures in detection and enforcement to curb corruption.
Transparency frameworks
Public sectormanagement experts distinguish between two
types of transparency: access to information by recipients
(event transparency) and administrative processes which
are accessible, simple, and comprehensible (process trans-
parency) [91]. Organizations need transparency in four
directions. Upward transparency allows a supervisor to
observe the conduct or results produced by a subordinate.
Downward transparency allows subordinates to observe
the conduct/results of supervisors. Outward transparency
refers to when those inside an organization can see what is
happening outside an organization (e.g. benchmarking).
Inward transparency allows those outside an organization
to see what is going on within [91].
Open public meetings is a mode to increase transpar-
ency [15]. Meetings provide an opportunity for govern-
ment to share information and solicit citizen input, and
for citizens to voice concerns and demand a response
from officials. Piotrowski and Borry (2010) have created
a transparency framework applicable to open public
meetings at the local government level including neces-
sary aspects such as notice and agenda, minutes, rules
about holding closed sessions, public comment, and doc-
umentation [15].
In addition to modeling modes of transparency (like
public meetings), stakeholders have adapted transpar-
ency models to topics such as clinical trials [92]. Clinical
trial transparency addresses the problem that researchers
sometimes avoid publishing disappointing trial results



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































research literature and possibly affect the quality and
safety of treatments [94]. The clinical trial transparency
model promotes five standards: 1) trial registration (trials
registered before they start); 2) summary results posting
(key results made public within 12 months; 3) full trial
reports (detailed findings proactively disclosed); 4) aca-
demic publication (trial results published with peer
review); and 5) individual participant data sharing [92].
Paschke and co-authors present a model (Figure
3) to show how transparency, combined with par-
ticipation, can enable accountability. Information
on standards and commitments, decisions and
results, and responsive actions taken by govern-
ment are used by citizens and oversight bodies to
demand explanations (answerability) and conse-
quences (sanctions) [10].
Accountability frameworks
Brinkerhoff (2004) argues that answerability, or the obli-
gation of public officials to provide information on
actions taken and to justify these actions to oversight
actors, is the essence of accountability. Justification of
actions involves a bi-directional exchange of information
between accountable actors and those in positions of
oversight [95]. Brinkerhoff’s conceptual model of
accountability outlines three types: financial, perfor-
mance, and political. Financial accountability assures
proper allocation and use of resources through budget/
accounting controls and participatory budget processes.
Performance accountability examines the degree to
which outputs align with pre-determined performance
targets. Political/democratic accountability monitors the
degree to which governments and institutions deliver on
promises, act in the best interest of citizens, and respond
effectively to societal needs [95]. To disrupt the cycle of
abuse, accountability systems must identify responsible
actors and determine patterns of interaction, and develop
the capacity of actors to support accountability (promote
answerability, impose and enforce sanctions) [95]. In
2014, Brinkerhoff and Bossert expanded on the idea of
shared accountability that strategically engages non-
governmental actors. This revised model identifies
three categories of actors – citizens/clients, the state,
and service providers [96]. A primary limitation of this
model is its assumption of equal power and influence: in
fact, providers and state actors generally tend to have
more power than clients/citizens [96–98].
Jonathan Fox (2015) examines tactical and strate-
gic approaches to social accountability involving citi-
zens and civil society organizations. He proposes
a ‘sandwich strategy’ framework, focused on the
mutual empowerment of state actors (reformists
with power over policy implementation who create
opportunities for citizen voice) and citizens (engaged
in public interest advocacy and collective action). The
opportunity for change can arise from pro-
accountability forces in the society or state; the key
to success is the ability and willingness of counter-
parts in the other domain to support and empower
others to act. Practical actions for improving account-
ability include providing user-centered information;
establishing communication channels through which
citizens exercise voice in a collective manner and
state actors can respond to citizen demands; addres-
sing past accountability problems (i.e. citizen fear,
lack of enforcement of sanctions); and enhancing
the capacity of states to demand accountability from
providers and impose sanctions.
Anti-corruption approaches
Strategies for anti-corruption should align with national
anti-corruption institutions and strategies, and need to
consider both prevention and enforcement [99,100].
Figure 3. How transparency and participation enable accountability.
Source: Adapted from Paschke, Dimancesco, Vian, et al. 2018.
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Recent analyses have reviewed evidence of the links
between ACTA initiatives, and health outcomes [101],
public financial management and health systems perfor-
mance [102], and technology and good governance
[103]. Additionally, a Cochrane Review assessed evi-
dence of health sector anti-corruption interventions
[104]. Although the authors noted a paucity of rigorous
effectiveness research on this topic, they found some
evidence in support of four strategies. These include: 1)
fraud control and independent complaint mechanisms
(evidence from the US and India); 2) guidelines regulat-
ing physician-industry interactions (evidence from
Europe and US); 3) internal controls, rules and proce-
dures to strengthen financial and accounting systems in
health centers (evidence from US); and 4) increased
transparency and reduced incentives for informal pay-
ments (evidence from Kyrgyzstan health reforms) [104].
We briefly mention some intervention strategies
and highlight areas where stakeholders are working
to increase transparency, strengthen accountability,
and fight corruption. Categories include corruption
risk assessment, transparency interventions, com-
plaint mechanisms, audit, SF medicines, and informal
payments.
Risk assessment
Hussmann (2011) has catalogued many tools available
to identify, track and measure health sector corruption
(Table 4) [105]. Health sector corruption risk assess-
ments have been conducted by UNDP, Council of
Europe, USAID and others [106,107]. Separate assess-
ment tools have analyzed financial management sys-
tems for compliance with anti-corruption measures
[108,109] and reviewed health laws for anti-corruption
provisions [110]. In the MENA region, UNDP is
working on corruption risk mapping as part of long-
term engagement based on prevention, risk manage-
ment, and multi-stakeholder engagement.
Transparency interventions
WHO has guided two major advances to promote
transparency in order to fight corruption, including
the Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA), a multi-
stakeholder initiative implemented in seven countries
between 2008 and 2015, and the Good Governance in
Medicines (GGM) Programme, which included
a transparency assessment tool for the pharmaceutical
sector. These initiatives, described in detail elsewhere,
are briefly summarized below [97,111,112]. A third
major category of transparency interventions is com-
munity monitoring, report cards, and social audits.
● Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA). The
Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA) is
a multi-stakeholder voluntary partnership to
bring together government officials, NGOs, and
pharmaceutical companies to increase trust and
pressure for greater accountability and evidence-
based policy-making. Data disclosure surveys con-
ducted in each of the seven MeTA countries
assessed public disclosure of information on med-
icines policies, practices, and availability and price
indicators. An evaluation found that MeTA
achieved its goal of creating the multi-
stakeholder shared space in which government,
civil society, and private sector players could
have a voice in policy making [112]. In Jordan,
MeTA successfully advocated for a government-
run medicine policy unit to build capacity for
collecting and analyzing access data. In Peru,
MeTA created an observatory with government-
Table 4. Key tools to identify, track and measure corruption risks.
General Tools
Cross-cutting Political economy analysis; vulnerability to corruption assessments; value chain analysis; sectoral accountability assessment;
value for money audits; analysis of governance in health care systems
Budget and Resource Management Tools
Budget process Public expenditure and financial accountability indicators (PEFA); focus groups and interviews with public officials, recipient
institutions, and civil society
Payroll leakages Public expenditure tracking surveys and reviews (PETS, PERS); household surveys; focus groups with public officials and
health workers
In-kind leakages PETS; quantitative service delivery surveys (QSDS); facility surveys; focus groups with public officials, recipient institutions,
and health workers
Pharmaceuticals GGM Programme; International Drug Price Indicator Guide; internet-based drug procurement price databases
Individual Provider Tools
Job purchasing Official administrative records combined with facility surveys; interviews with public officials and former officials; governance
and anti-corruption country diagnostic surveys
Health worker
absenteeism
QSDS; surprise visits; direct observation; facility records; focus groups or interviews with facility heads and patients
Informal Payments tools
Informal payments Household surveys (World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey, Demographic and Health Survey); facility exit surveys
and score cards; focus groups and interviews with patients, providers, and staff; Governance and Anti-Corruption Country
Diagnostic surveys
Corruption perceptions and experience
Perceptions World Bank Governance Indicators, TI Corruption Perception Index; World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption Country
Diagnostic surveys; national level perception surveys by CSO and others
Experiences AfroBarometer; LatinBarometer; EuroBarometer; TI Global Corruption Barometer; National experience based surveys; patient
satisfaction surveys; report (score) cards; focus groups
Source: Hussman, 2011.
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mandated reporting of medicine prices [112]. In
some countries, power imbalances seemed evi-
dent: CSOs did not have the same power to engage
in policy dialogue as other stakeholders [97].
● Good Governance in Medicines Programme.
WHO’s Medicines Strategy 2004–2007 highlighted
corruption as a priority. In response, WHO
launched the Good Governance in Medicines
(GGM) Programme, involving 38 countries in
transparency assessment and development/imple-
mentation of a national pharmaceutical governance
framework [10]. A 2013 evaluation report found the
program had promoted revised pharmaceutical
laws and regulations, leading to improved transpar-
ency and more active management of conflicts of
interest [113]. Further evaluation research is needed
to assess how these tactics affect policy and proce-
dures to control corruption in the pharmaceutical
sector.
Community monitoring, report cards, and social
audit
A recent review cites evidence from Malawi, Uganda,
and Tajikistan supporting the effectiveness of report
cards and community monitoring [101]. The
Transparency for Development project used scorecards
in their citizen-led accountability programs in Tanzania
and Indonesia [114]. The program allowed citizens to
develop plans to deal with the specific problems facing
their community, and choose contextually-appropriate
actions to further accountability [114]. However, this
program did not have a statistically significant impact
on use or content of maternal and newborn health
services [115]. The authors believe this is because the
causal pathways to improving services were long and
complicated, and it was hard for citizens to translate
their plans into actions [115]. UNESCO International
Institute for Educational Planning concluded that creat-
ing report cards and sharing performance data must be
accompanied by political action tomodify power imbal-
ances to ensure the data are used effectively, and that
‘malpractice is addressed with clear consequence’
(Table 5). The International Budget Partnership pro-
motes social audit as a technique to monitor service
delivery and expenditures [116,117].
Whistleblowing and complaint mechanisms
Internal whistleblowing, and complaint mechanisms for
patients, are important ACTA tools [1]. They allow
organizations to investigate or refer alleged corruption
incidents, identify and discipline or educate careless or
incompetent staff, and revise unworkable official proce-
dures that may be leading to abuses or unaccountable
actions. These mechanisms can be set up at the project,
organization, sectoral, or country level. Protection for
whistleblowers is essential.
In Karnataka state, India, a Health Vigilance Officer
(part of the Karnataka Lokayukta, a public complaints
agency) visited 202 administrative units between 2001
and 2006, handling 100–200 complaints per visit [118].
Over 800 complaints were serious enough to refer to
police. However, some cases were not prosecuted
because police lacked investigative capacity. Other pro-
secution efforts revealed conflicts in State versus Federal
authority that were difficult to resolve. Committed lea-
dership and willingness of citizens to complain was not
enough to overcome the legislative and justice system
constraints which limited the extent to which officials
could be held accountable [119]. In Albania, the govern-
ment’s anti-corruption complaint online portal received
1,605 health-related complaints (10% of total) between
2013–2017 [120]. About 75%were determined not to be
corruption-related, including complaints about long
lines and poor quality services. In addition, with support
from a World Bank loan, the Prime Minister’s Office
implemented a citizen feedback text messaging inter-
vention. From October 2016 until August 2017, the top
three issues identified in hospitals were poor conditions,
lack of drugs, and unqualified staff. Citizens regarded
the program favorably because they felt listened to. Such
a program may help to deter corruption because public
officials know that the text messages are being sent, and
that citizens may report wrong-doing [120]. Yet, com-
plaint mechanisms can only work if there is adequate
staffing, resources, and ability to handle the complaints
raised. Governments must check on whether health
officials have addressed complaints.
Audit
Audit can be a powerful tool to identify malfeasance.
External audit of the GAVI program (formerly the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations) in
Cameroon covering the period 2008 to 2010 and first
quarter of 2011 revealed $3.1 million in misspent
Table 5. Recommendations to use report cards to promote
transparency and accountability.
(1) Create legal provisions for disclosure of facility data
(2) Formulate a clear theory of change that makes the link between
data and accountability
(3) Consider power imbalances and cultural constraints when
designing an open data policy
(4) Select data that are critical to monitoring financial, management,
or clinical accountability
(5) Prioritize data that are relevant for patients and citizens to
encourage them to take part in health facility accountability efforts
(6) Design mechanisms enabling fair comparisons between facilities
(7) Simplify the presentation of data while maintaining their technical
accuracy
(8) Create a range of avenues (both online and offline) for citizens to
access data
(9) Train facility management committees, health workers, patient
interest groups, and selected community groups on how data can
be used to demand accountability
(10) Introduce a legal grievance redressal mechanism for patients and
communities
Source: Adapted from http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/10-ways-promote-
transparency-and-accountability-education-4307.
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funds, including fraud [108]. Audit reports can trig-
ger prosecutions, and the threat of regular or surprise
audits may have a deterrent effect on corruption
[102]. Researchers have studied the link between cor-
ruption and effective internal audit function in
Ghana, a decade after a 2003 reform to strengthen
the Internal Audit Agency [121]. They found that size
and independence of the internal audit department
were associated with effectiveness of the internal
audit in reducing corruption. They conclude that
full implementation of internal audit regulations
and laws, and assurance of the independence of the
internal audit function, can help fight administrative
corruption [121].
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) are government
agencies responsible for oversight of public expendi-
tures. They may have different names, models or
mandates in different countries, but are defined by
their role of external audit on government expendi-
ture and performance, as part of a larger national
integrity system. A recent literature review found no
studies on the role of SAI and the health sector [102].
The Albania Transparency in Health Engagement
project (2017–2019) worked with the Albanian SAI
to increase the number and quality of performance
audits in the health sector [122]. The project is build-
ing capacity of auditors understand the complex
referral and treatment systems in the health sector,
and to effectively work with civil society to document
problems. There is a need for more research to docu-
ment a) the quality of internal and external audit
capacity in the health sector, b) the effect of audit
on corruption in the health sector.
Systems-level approaches to manage substandard
and falsified medicines
A 2016 systematic review examined international
experience with strategies to detect and prevent SF
medicines [51]. They recommended a systems-level
approach to protect the supply chain. Given the glo-
bal trade in pharmaceuticals and presence of orga-
nized crime networks, international collaboration is
essential for detection and successful prosecution.
Examples of supranational organizations supporting
such efforts include the Pharmaceutical Security
Institute Counterfeit Incident System (PSI CIS), the
WHO Medical Product Alert System, and VigiBase,
a global database of individual case safety reports
(adverse events, product complaints etc.). The WHO
Member State mechanism on substandard and falsi-
fied medical products produces a workplan with
activities related to training, expanding focal point
networks, and improving member states’ understand-
ing of detection technology and ‘track-and-trace’
models [123]. Participation in systems like these
requires a well-functioning national medicine regula-
tory agency with adequate capacity, something that is
still lacking in many Sub-Saharan African countries
[51]. France, Norway, and the Netherlands have
increased the terms of incarceration for people con-
victed of falsifying medicines, and are raising consu-
mer awareness to help them identify fake medicines,
thus reducing the potential financial benefits of sell-
ing fake medicines [51].
Standardized monitoring of informal payments
Many studies have measured informal payments for
health services; however, methodological differences
complicate data comparisons. Khodamoradi et al.
(2017) noted differences in how informal payments are
defined, locations (e.g. hospital or primary care), sample
size, sample selection and data collection, recall period,
and how affordability measures are calculated [22].
Some studies include medicines bought outside the
facility as informal payments, while others do not [21],
and some studies try to separate gifts from other types of
informal payment [124]. Research designs with prob-
abilistic sampling (e.g. random or stratified) may pro-
vide more generalizable estimates compared to research
conducted with convenience samples, and it is impor-
tant to employ methods adapted to the potentially sen-
sitive issues where people may not feel comfortable
admitting they made payments [125]. Khodamoradi
et al. have proposed creating a universal research map
for standardized definitions, language, and methods,
and recommended a global study to assess informal
payments in all countries using such a tool.
Addressing under-resourced health systems
Pressure to perform without having adequate funding,
human resources, or institutional capacity is a barrier to
achieving health goals. Resource limitations can
increase risk for corruption, in addition to corruption
making resources less available [126]. Informal pay-
ments were characterized by one research team as ‘a
saving mechanism for those wanting to escape the lim-
itations of a continuously decaying health system’ [127].
The U.S. Veterans Administration faced a scandal in
2014 that also illustrates this connection [128,129].
There was a mismatch between performance goals and
adequate funding to reach those goals. As a result,
employees felt pressured to falsify data and hide actual
performance failures [130].
Potential areas for research
To document and compare corruption risks and pat-
terns, researchers and international organizations
should develop guidance on risk assessment, includ-
ing how to mine existing databases or collect primary
data (interview guides, transparency assessment tools,
methods for assessing problems like absenteeism and
ghost workers). WHO could adopt standardized
methods for collecting and reporting indicators on
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informal payments, to address the wide variation and
lack of comparability in methods currently being
used [21,22,34,124]. Measurement and assessment
tools need to be validated.
Specific interventions which merit further study
include fraud control and data mining; transparency
policies; whistleblowing and complaint mechanisms;
community monitoring; management control tools
and health sector audit strengthening; conflict of
interest management; regulatory reform to incenti-
vize payers and provider organizations to control
corruption.
For each area of intervention, several research ques-
tions could be relevant. First, research requires a clearly
defined intervention, strategy, and expected outcomes.
For example, what are the essential features or compo-
nents of a staff whistleblowing program or patient com-
plaint mechanism? This work will need to draw from
theory and practice in specific settings and types of health
organizations. It requires thinking through the theory of
change for each intervention, and considering how we
will measure outcomes. It may be possible to develop
a core model, but researchers will also need to consider
how contextual factors will influence the model.
A second area of research is effectiveness studies, to
determine if interventions work in practice. Finally,
research is needed to assess how strategies for implemen-
tation affect the adoption, use, and impact of interven-
tions to control corruption risk. Implementation science
researchers could examine why some institutions adopt
management control tools while others do not.
Implementation science research could also address the
impact of attitudes, skills, knowledge, or the enabling
environment on scaling up interventions.
Conclusions
This study documented concepts, frameworks, and
approaches to identify anti-corruption strategies
and to address the consequences of corruption in
health systems. We found six recent frameworks
that may help practitioners understand and cate-
gorize corruption risk and elements to consider as
levers for anti-corruption interventions. A growing
body of literature suggests that corruption endan-
gers progress in achieving better health, economic
growth and development. Corruption is a barrier to
achieving UHC, and requires preventive actions
and risk mitigation. Yet, our review also finds
that research to design, implement, and evaluate
evidence-based policy and management interven-
tions is lacking. The global community should
focus greater attention and resources to strengthen
health systems to control corruption and to pro-
mote transparency and accountability throughout
the health sector.
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